COMMENTS

Running the Caucus-Race: Prevailing Parties
and Fee Shifting under ERISA
Da-Wai Hut

[T]hey began running when they liked, and left off when they

liked, so that it was not easy to know when the race was over.
However, when they had been running half an hour or so,... the
Dodo suddenly called out "The race is over!", and they all

crowded round it, panting, and asking, "But who has won?" 1
The Employee

Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974

("ERISA") 2 is a comprehensive federal law regulating the private
employee benefit system. Congress enacted ERISA to address concerns that abuses in the management of pension plans caused the
wrongful denial of benefits to workers. The enactment of ERISA
provided for a means to ensure that benefits promised to workers

would be paid.! Congress hoped that ERISA would meet this goal "by
t B.A. 1996, Northwestern University; J.D. Candidate 2000, The University of Chicago.
' Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 26 (Penguin Classics 1998). This passage
describes the chaotic scene in which the Dodo and some other "curious creatures" demonstrated
the Caucus-Race for the inquisitive Alice. The Race, apparently without rules or restrictions, involved the competitors running around in different directions, and it ended with uncertainty as
to who was the winner.
29 USC §§ 1001 et seq (1994).
' Although the term "retirement" appears in the title of the law, ERISA covers a wider
range of employee benefits than its name suggests. In addition to pension plans, ERISA also
governs health care, disability, and accident benefit plans. See Barbara J. Coleman, Primer on
Employee Retirement Income Security Act v (BNA 3d ed 1989).
. Abuses included companies' failure to properly fund employee benefit plans or diversion
of plan assets to other uses so that there was not enough money to pay benefits. See Dana J.
Domone, Primer on ERISA FiduciaryDuties 1 (BNA 1994). See also HR Rep No 93-553, 93d
Cong, 2d Sess 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 4639 (stating that ERISA was intended "to
remedy certain defects in the private retirement system").
See Coleman, Primeron Employee Retirement Income Security Act at v (cited in note 3).
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establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate
6
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.",
As part of its remedies, ERISA provides for courts to award attorneys' fees to parties litigating employee benefit claims covered by
the law.7 In the typical case, an ERISA beneficiary requests fee shifting as part of her recovery when she uses the court access provision of
the statute to sue plan administrators to obtain denied benefits. 8 Examples of such requests can be found in a wide variety of ERISA lawsuits, including
claims for pension benefits 9 and employee health care
10
coverage.
Although any party can ask for and receive reimbursement for
the costs of her legal efforts, courts have allowed fee shifting regularly
only in certain categories of cases. The loose pattern of precedents in
which courts either have enforced or rejected claims for attorneys'
fees comprises the federal common law governing fee shifting under
ERISA. These cases represent the federal courts' efforts to instill uniformity and order in their application of the otherwise open-ended
statutory language of the ERISA fee shifting provision. Despite some
progress toward coherence in the awarding of fees under ERISA, the
absence of clear textual directives in the statute has led courts to
reach conflicting outcomes, creating ambiguity as to when courts
should require one party to pay another's legal expenses." For example, while success in a lawsuit is not explicitly required by the statutory
language of ERISA, courts applying the statute have held that attorneys' fees should be awarded only to prevailing parties. Courts, thus,
must face the unresolved problem of identifying parties properly eligible to receive attorneys' fees in ERISA litigation; that is, the courts
must answer the question, "But who has won?"
This Comment explores the requirements that parties in ERISA
litigation should have to meet in order for courts to properly grant
6

29 USC § 1001(b).

29 USC § 1132(g)(1).
See Ann C. Bertino, Comment, The Need for a Mandatory Award of Attorney's Fees for
PrevailingPlaintiffs in ERISA Benefits Cases, 41 Cath U L Rev 871, 873-74 (1992) (outlining
steps of an ERISA lawsuit).
See Denzler v Questech, nc, 80 F3d 97,99-100 (4th Cir 1996).
See 7iemeyer v Community Mutual Insurance Co, 8 F3d 1094,1095-97 (6th Cir 1993).
See Cottrill v Sparrow,Johnson & Ursillo,Inc, 100 F3d 220, 226 (1st Cir 1996) (acknowledging that the ERISA fee shifting doctrine presents "some conflicting authority"). See also
Erik Phelps, Case Note, A BalancingTest for Attorney Fee Awards Under ERISA, 64 Geo Wash L
Rev 846, 848 (1996) ("The result of this statutory grant of unbridled discretion is a split among
the United States courts of appeals in the interpretation and application of the ERISA fee
shifting provision."); David E. Gordon and Robert N. Eccles, ERISA Attorneys' Fees: An Unpredictable Situation, 6 Inside Litig 17 (Oct 1992) (commenting on the divergent practices of the
courts in awarding ERISA attorneys' fees).
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their requests for fee shifting. More precisely, it considers possible
ways for courts to determine whether the ERISA party asking for an
award of attorneys' fees should receive such indemnification by virtue
of winning at trial or obtaining a settlement. This Comment analyzes
what it means to be a winner in ERISA litigation and proposes that
courts focus on the legal merits of a party's case to determine if the
party has prevailed.
Part I of this Comment considers the textual language and legislative history of the ERISA fee shifting provision. It then provides a
broad overview of the case law that guides the courts in awarding attorneys' fees in ERISA cases. Part II narrows the scope of examination and specifically considers the different approaches that courts
have taken to determine whether parties in ERISA lawsuits are eligible for fee shifting. Finally, Part III proposes a standard for evaluating
whether ERISA litigants qualify as prevailing parties by considering
the legal merits of the underlying claims. Part III also argues that
courts should no longer use causation-the catalyst test-as the standard for defining when parties prevail in litigation. The use of the
catalyst test for determining who has prevailed engenders doctrinal
inconsistencies and undermines the efficiency of the ERISA litigation
process. The proposed legal merits test offers a better solution to the
prevailing party dilemma. Specifically, it has two advantages over the
causation analysis that many courts now use. First, the legal merits test
allows ERISA's definition of prevailing party to make more sense in
the context of other rules associated with ERISA fee shifting. Second,
the proposed standard promotes efficiency in ERISA litigation, by encouraging parties to pursue efficient, welfare-enhancing settlements
and allowing courts to conserve judicial resources.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE EXISTING PRACTICE OF FEE SHIFTING
UNDER

ERISA

A. Statutory Authority for Fee Shifting in ERISA
As a general rule, parties are not entitled to recover the costs of
their legal efforts from their opponents.12 However, statutory provisions may give courts the authority to award attorneys' fees in certain
kinds of litigation.3 The fee shifting provision in ERISA gives courts
See David Shub, Note, PrivateAttorneys General,Prevailing Parties,and Public Benefit
Attorney's Fees Awards for Civil Rights Plaintiffs,42 Duke L J 706, 709 (1992) (stating that the
American rule requires each party in a civil case to bear its own attorneys' fees); Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 Duke L J 651
(describing the general American practice of making each party responsible for the costs of its
legal actions).
" See Rowe, 1982 Duke L J at 651 (cited in note 12) (explaining that statutory provisions for
fee shifting can allow departures from the usual prohibition against the awarding of attorneys'
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the discretion
to require one party to indemnify the other party's legal
14
expenses.
The statutory language through which ERISA grants courts the
power to award attorneys' fees is broad and unconstrained: "[Tlhe

court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs
' The text of ERISA gives no indication of
of action to either party."'
limits to the courts' discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. Legislative

history is equally unhelpful in suggesting proper applications of fee
shifting under ERISA. 16 With no other guidance available, ERISA
seems to authorize the courts to exercise unbridled discretion in fee

shifting."
Responding to the absence of instructions on how to apply the
ERISA fee shifting provision, courts have developed a set of rules to
limit their own discretion in the awarding of attorneys' fees.'8 These

rules control the process through which courts decide whether to
grant petitions for fees. 9 Although some differences exist, courts gen-

erally proceed along a two-step process to determine whether fee
shifting is appropriate: first, they ask whether the fee applicant is a
prevailing party eligible to receive attorneys' fees,n and second, they
consider whether the case presents the proper conditions for fee

shifting.
B.

Proper Conditions for Fee Shifting

The Tenth Circuit was the first circuit to establish a standard for
determining the appropriateness of awarding ERISA attorneys' fees

fees).
See Eaves v Penn, 587 F2d 453, 464-65 (10th Cir 1978) (commenting that § 1132(g)(1) of
ERISA allows courts to award attorneys' fees).
29 USC § 1132(g)(1).
See Armistead v Vernitron Corp, 944 F2d 1287,1303 (6th Cir 1991) ("[N]o history exists to
provide guidance to the courts.").
" See Eddy v ColonialLife InsuranceCo of America, 59 F3d 201,203 (DC Cir 1995) ("Neither the statute nor the legislative history indicates whether or how that discretion should be
guided."). See also Phelps, 64 Geo Wash L Rev at 848 (cited in note 11) (noting the absence of
guidance for courts in the application of the ERISA fee shifting provision).
See Hummell v S.E. Rykoff& Co, 634 F2d 446,453 (9th Cir 1980) (agreeing with other circuits that courts should have guidelines to limit their discretion to apply ERISA's fee shifting
provision); Eaves, 587 F2d at 465 (prescribing factors for courts to consider when they are determining whether to award attorneys' fees).
" For a basic description of the ERISA fee shifting process, see Mark Howard Berlind, Note,
Attorney's Fees Under ERISA: When is an Award Appropriate?,71 Cornell L Rev 1037,1038-49
(1986).
See, for example, Martin v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, Inc, 115 F3d 1201, 1210
(4th Cir 1997) (holding that only prevailing parties can be eligible for further fee shifting considerations), cert denied, 522 US 2029 (1997); Flanaganv Inland Empire Electric Workers Pension
Plan and Trust, 3 F3d 1246, 1253 (9th Cir 1993) (concluding that attorneys' fees may not be
awarded to parties who have not succeeded in litigation),
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in Eaves v Penn.' The Eaves court held that courts should balance five
factors in any decision to award ERISA attorneys' fees.2 These factors
are:
(1) the degree of the offending parties' culpability or bad faith;
(2) the degree of the ability of the offending parties to personally
satisfy an award of attorneys fees; (3) whether or not an award of
attorneys fees against the offending parties would deter other
persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) the amount of
benefit conferred on members of the pension plan as a whole;
and (5) the relative merits of the parties' position[s].n
This five-part test quickly gained widespread acceptance among the
different federal circuits, and courts most commonly apply this test to
determine the propriety of awarding attorneys' fees in ERISA law-

suits.21
The Eaves test is a product of the courts' interpretation of
ERISA and is not statutorily required in any sense. As such, it is not
the exclusive test used by the courts to determine the appropriateness
of fee shifting.2- However, despite the criticism that the Eaves factors
are judicial constructions lacking a basis in law,2 the Eaves test is still
the most commonly accepted standard that courts apply when
awarding attorneys' fees under ERISA.2'

587 F2d 453,464-65 (10th Cir 1978).
Id.
Id at465.

Every circuit has applied the Eaves five-part test in some form or another. Even circuits
that developed their own ERISA fee shifting standards have occasionally turned to the factors
found in Eaves. See Gray v New England Telephone & Telegraph Co, 792 F2d 251, 257-58 (1st
Cir 1986); InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v New York State Teamsters Council Health &
Hospital Fund, 903 F2d 919, 923-24 (2d Cir 1990); Ellison v Shenango Inc Pension Board, 956
F2d 1268,1273 (3d Cir 1992); Quesinberry v Life Insurance Co of North America, 987 F2d 1017,
1028-29 (4th Cir 1993) (en banc); Iron Workers Local No 272 v Bowen, 624 F2d 1255,1266 (5th
Cir 1980); 7iemeyer v Community Mutual Insurance Co,8 F3d 1094,1101 (6th Cir 1993); Leigh v
Engle, 858 F2d 361,369-70 (7th Cir 1988); Lawrence v Westerhaus,749 F2d 494,495-96 (8th Cir
1984); Hummell v LE. Rykoff& Co, 634 F2d 446,453 (9th Cir 1980); Nachwalter v Christie,805
F2d 956,961-62 (11th Cir 1986); Eddy v Colonial Life Insurance Co of America, 59 F3d 201,206
(DC Cir 1995).
' See Hummell, 634 F2d at 453 (directing district courts to consider the Eaves factors
"among others" for awarding ERISA attorneys' fees);Iron Workers, 624 F2d at 1266 (noting that
none of the Eaves "factors is necessarily decisive, and some may not be apropos in a given
case"); Cottrillv Sparrow,Johnson & Ursillo,Inc,100 F3d 220,225 (1st Cir 1996) (finding that the
Eaves factors "are exemplary rather than exclusive").
' See Armistead v Vernitron Corp, 944 F2d 1287,1303 (6th Cir 1991) ("The Eaves court has
been criticized for failing to explain how it developed the factors or why they should be used.").
See id at 1303-04 (commenting that the "broad wording of the statute has the effect of...
permitting the federal courts to devise a common law of fee-shifting" and that the Eaves factors
"are as good a place as any to begin the development of a common law of fee-shifting under
ERISA, even if they do not turn out to be the final word on the subject").
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An alternative to the Eaves standard is a two-part test created by
the Seventh Circuit in Bittner v Sadoff & Rudoy Industries.2 Under

the Bittner test, courts should award attorneys' fees to winning parties
in ERISA litigation unless (1) the losing parties have argued a position with a solid basis that was more than merely not frivolous, but less
than meritorious, or (2) special circumstances have made awarding
fees unjust.2 While some courts have chosen to apply the Bittner twopart test to determine whether awards of attorneys' fees were justified,n it is unclear whether this test adds anything to the ERISA fee
shifting doctrine. The Bittner court itself stated that its decision did not
question "the soundness or utility" of the Eaves factors. Other courts
also have observed that the different tests should always lead to the
same results because they ask the same basic questions.n Sentiment of
this kind demonstrates, on the whole, the cohesiveness of the courts on
how they should determine the propriety of fee shifting.
C. Presumptions for Fee Shifting
Notwithstanding the general agreement on what factors should
guide ERISA fee shifting, courts sometimes disagree on how freely
they should award attorneys' fees. Most courts have favored a neutral
approach to fee shifting in ERISA litigation-that is, they have no
presumption in favor or against it. However, a small number of
728 F2d 820 (7th Cir 1984).
Id at 830.
See Holder v PrudentialInsurance Co of America, 951 F2d 89,91-92 (5th Cir 1992) (finding denial of fees proper even under Bittner); Tesch v GeneralMotors Corp, 937 F2d 359,362 (7th
Cir 1991) (reversing award of attorneys' fees using Bittner);Nichol v Pullman Standard,Inc, 889
F2d 115,121-22 (7th Cir 1989) (affirming district court's use of Bittner in denying fees); Sigmon
Fuel Co v Tennessee Valley Authority, 754 F2d 162,166 (6th Cir 1985) (applying Bittner). But see
Ellison, 956 F2d at 1274 (rejecting the plaintiff's "request to adopt the special circumstances
rule"); Eddy, 59 F3d at 206 n 8 (stating that the Bittner test's rationale was unpersuasive).
Bittner,728 F2d at 829.
Little v Cox's Supermarkets,71 F3d 637, 644 (7th Cir 1995) ("[Wjhichever approach is
used, the 'bottom-line question' is the same."). See also Tesch, 937 F2d at 363 ("We need not
concern ourselves with choosing between the multi-factor approach and Bittner's 'substantially
justified' standard. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the application of one model
rather than the other would alter our decision concerning the propriety of an award of costs or
fees.").
" See Denzler v Questech,Inc, 80 F3d 97,104 (4th Cir 1996) (stating that "there was no presumption in favor of awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing insured or beneficiary"); Eddy v
ColonialLife Insurance Co ofAmerica, 59 F3d 201,204 (DC Cir 1995) ("Although we agree that
ERISA lawsuits vindicate important interests, we are unpersuaded that these interests justify the
presumptive award of fees."); McPherson v Employees' Pension Plan of American Re-Insurance
Co, Inc, 33 F3d 253,254 (3d Cir 1994) ("We have further instructed that there is no presumption
that a successful plaintiff in an ERISA suit should receive an award in the absence of exceptional circumstances."); Ellison v Shenango Inc Pension Board,956 F2d 1268,1275 (3d Cir 1992)

("We do not think a presumption in favor of granting attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs is
required or appropriate."); Armistead v Vernitron Corp, 944 F2d 1287, 1303 (6th Cir 1991) (re-
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courts have argued that there should be a presumption for awarding
attorneys' fees to ERISA plaintiffs.4
Supporters of a fee shifting presumption have compared ERISA
to federal civil rights statutes,' and have contended that the similar

remedial nature of ERISA to civil rights laws justifies the presumption that plaintiffs "should ordinarily receive attorney's fees."'' Opponents of the fee shifting presumption have rejected this reasoning and

have pointed out that the analogy between ERISA and statutes protecting civil rights is inapt because ERISA concerns a matter of less
public importance" and because ERISA litigants have sufficient private pecuniary motives to sue for their own rights.-

It is questionable whether the presence of a presumption for fee
shifting in ERISA litigation really changes how courts actually award
fusing "to treat all successful ERISA plaintiffs as private attorneys general" entitled to fees);
Iron Workers Local No 272 v Bowen, 624 F2d 1255,1265-66 (5th Cir 1980) (rejecting argument
that attorneys' fees should be awarded to plaintiffs as a matter of course).
See, for example, Stanton v Larry Fowler Trucking, Inc,52 F3d 723,729 (8th Cir 1995) (declaring that a prevailing ERISA plaintiff should ordinarily receive awards of attorneys' fees);
Hechenbergerv Western Electric Co, Inc, 786 F2d 347,348 (8th Cir 1986) (stating a presumption
for fee shifting in ERISA litigation).
1"See Landro v Glendenning Motorways; Inc, 625 F2d 1344,1356 (8th Cir 1980) (comparing
ERISA to other federal remedial legislation that allows attorneys' fees awards, such as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,42 USC § 2000a-3(b) (1994), and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act
of 1976,42 USC § 1988(b) (1994)).
Smith v CMTA-1AM PensionTrust, 746 F2d 587,590 (9th Cir 1984).
r See Eddy, 59 F3d at 205-06 ("We join those circuits which have concluded that the special
reasons for adopting a fee-shifting presumption in civil rights actions do not warrant adopting
the presumption in ERISA cases."); Armistead, 944 F2d at 1303 ("Because this litigation so patently lacks the public importance of a civil rights suit, it is an apt illustration of our reasons for
refusing ... to treat all successful ERISA plaintiffs as private attorneys general, absent some special circumstance."); Iron Workers, 624 F2d at 1265 ("The policies underlying ERISA are certainly important ones,but they simply do not rise to the level of assuring that all citizens are accorded their civil rights.").
' See Eddy, 59 F3d at 206 ("Neither ERISA's language nor its legislative history imply the
presumption, and fee-shifting is less necessary as an incentive in ERISA, not because ERISA
protects unimportant interests, but because the interests it protects are monetary, rather than
dignitary.").
In contrast, a presumption for fee shifting exists under antitrust law even though the plaintiffs in those cases frequently have significant private pecuniary motives. See PremierElectrical
Construction Co v National Electrical ContractorsAssociation, Inc, 814 F2d 358, 373 (7th Cir
1987) (noting that antitrust law provides for fee shifting); Home Placement Service; Inc v Providence Journal Co, 819 F2d 1199, 1210 (1st Cir 1987) (characterizing fee shifting under antitrust
law as "mandatory"); Baughman v Cooper-Jarrett,Inc,530 F2d 529,531 n 2 (3d Cir 1976) (arguing that courts should typically award attorneys' fees in antitrust litigation). The analogy between ERISA and antitrust law may be inapt, however, because fee shifting under antitrust law
involves a completely different set of considerations than ERISA fee shifting. For example, unlike ERISA fee shifting, courts awarding attorneys' fees in antitrust cases have not established a
prevailing party requirement. See Gulfstream III Associates; Inc v Gulfstream Aerospace Corp,
995 F2d 414,418 (3d Cir 1993) ("There is no 'prevailing party' language in Section 4 of the Clayton Act."); United States FootballLeague v NationalFootballLeague, 704 F Supp 474,479-80 (S
D NY 1989) (commenting that even the plaintiff who has won only nominal damages can still recover attorneys' fees in antitrust litigation).
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attorneys' fees. Most courts have been inconsistent and have applied a
presumption in some cases but not others.9 Another reason to think
that a presumption does not affect the final analysis of the courts
much is that most courts use the Eaves test for fee shifting." Finally,

the courts are uniform in granting only the requests of prevailing par41

ties for attorneys' fees regardless of whether a presumption exists.
These reasons all suggest that the fee shifting presumption has little
influence over the awarding of attorneys' fees in ERISA cases.
II. THE PREVAILING PARTY PROBLEM

A. The Prevailing Party Requirement
Although courts generally follow the Eaves factors in assessing
whether fee shifting is proper, they have achieved less uniformity in
resolving the question of who is eligible to receive attorneys' fees. The
language of ERISA clearly allows the possibility of awarding attorneys' fees to any party.42 This means that the law provides anyonewinning plaintiffs, winning defendants, losing plaintiffs, or losing defen-

dants-a chance to successfully recover the costs of ERISA actions.4
However, ERISA fee shifting is much different in practice. Courts
consistently have resisted the idea of awarding attorneys' fees to losing parties in ERISA lawsuits, and courts have only rarely permitted
fee shifting for parties who had not yet won." Indeed, the standard
Compare Chambless v Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 815 F2d 869, 872 (2d Cir
1987) (urging that that "attorney's fee provisions must be liberally construed to protect the
statutory purpose of vindicating retirement rights, even when small amounts are involved"), with
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v New York State Teamster Council Health & Hospital
Fund, 903 F2d 919, 923-24 (2d Cir 1990) (requiring the district court to apply the Eaves factors
after stating that ERISA did not require "mandatory" fee shifting). And compare Nachwalter v
Christie,805 F2d 956,962 (11th Cir 1986) (admonishing courts to remember the "essential remedial purpose" of ERISA to protect beneficiaries of pension plans), with McKnight v Southern
Life & Health InsuranceCo, 758 F2d 1566,1572 (11th Cir 1985) (rejecting the plaintiff s demand
for attorneys' fees and cautioning courts to refrain from awarding attorneys' fees to prevailing
parties outright).
See note 24.
4 See, for example, Flanaganv Inland Empire Electric Workers Pension Plan & Trust, 3 F3d
1246,1253 (9th Cir 1993) ("[W]e nonetheless conclude that a fee award is inappropriate now because they have not established a right to benefits, nor shown that the Plan or its fiduciaries have
violated ERISA."); Lawrence v Westerhaus, 749 F2d 494, 496 (8th Cir 1984) ("[A] court may
properly deny a claim for attorneys' fees solely on the ground that the plaintiff obtained no relief
under the statute.").
' The language of ERISA allows courts to exercise their discretion in awarding attorneys'
fees to "either" party. See 29 USC § 1132(g)(1).
See Berlind, 71 Cornell L Rev at 1038 (cited in note 19) (discussing all four classes of litigants while noting that no court would ever allow losing defendants to recover fees).
. See Phelpsv US West, Inc, 1998 US App LEXIS 6667, *7 (10th Cir) ("Although the statute
is not express on this point, most courts, including this one, have interpreted ERISA to allow an
award of attorney's fees only to prevailing parties."); Martin v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia,Inc, 115 F3d 1201,1210 (4th Cir 1997) ("[W]e have often indicated that reversal of a judg-
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courts apply to determine whether fee shifting is appropriate seems to
assume implicitly that only winning parties are eligible to recover attorneys' fees. For example, courts applying the Eaves five-part test
must look to certain factors-such as whether awarding attorneys'

fees would satisfy a deterrence purpose or whether the parties' positions have unequal merit4 -that can make sense only if the attorneys'
fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties.4' Likewise, the Bittner

court did not imagine that its two-part test would be applied to losing
parties.48
Although courts have awarded attorneys' fees to prevailing plain-

tiffs and defendants in past cases, it is clear that the application of the
ERISA fee shifting doctrine favors the former far more than the latter. Many circuits have expressed the view that courts ordinarily
4 9
should not award ERISA attorneys' fees to prevailing defendants.
The use of the Eaves test strengthens this presumption against requiring ERISA plaintiffs to pay attorneys' fee awards because many
of the Eaves factors seem more applicable to plaintiffs than defendants.' o Nonetheless, courts in some instances have ordered plaintiffs
ment under ERISA also requires reversal of any attendant award of attorneys' fees... Moreover, many of our sister circuits have imposed a 'prevailing party' limitation on the availability of
attorneys' fees under ERISA.... [O]nly a prevailing party is entitled to consideration for attorneys' fees in an ERISA action."), cert denied, 522 US 1029 (1997); Flanaganv Inland Empire
Electric Workers Pension Plan & Trust, 3 F3d 1246, 1253 (9th Cir 1993) (holding that plaintiff
must succeed on a "significant issue of litigation" to merit an award of attorneys' fees). But see
Miller v United Welfare Fund,72 F3d 1066,1074 (2d Cir 1995) (noting that ERISA "contains no
requirement that the party awarded attorneys' fees be the prevailing party"). See also Kayes v
Pacific Lumber Co, 51 F3d 1449,1469 (9th Cir 1995) (holding interim attorneys' fees available to
plaintiff even though the ERISA litigation had not jet reached its conclusion and the plaintiff
had not prevailed on a final judgment).
See Eddy v Colonial Life InsuranceCo of America, 59 F3d 201,208 (DC Cir 1995) ("IT]he
deterrent purpose of awarding attorneys' fees extends not only to deterring violations of ERISA
but also to deterring unnecessary prolongation or unjust resolution of ERISA claims."); Little v
Cox's Supermarkets,71 F3d 637,644-45 (7th Cir 1995) (awarding attorneys' fees against a losing
party who presented a case with absolutely no merit).
See Denzler v Questech, Inc,80 F3d 97, 104 (4th Cir 1996) (concluding that the "relative
merits of the parties' positions weighs in favor of awarding fees").
Other Eaves factors also suggest that only prevailing parties are entitled to receive attorneys' fees. See, for example, Ellison v Shenango Inc Pension Board, 956 F2d 1268, 1275 (3d Cir
1992) (concluding that courts can allow fee shifting on the basis of the "offending" party's "culpability or bad faith").
See Bittner v Sadoff & Rudoy Industries,728 F2d 820, 829 (7th Cir 1984) ("[I]t would be
an abuse of discretion for the district court to award attorney's fees to a losing party.").
See Flanagan,3 F3d at 1253 ("We reject the defendant's fee request because we see no
justification, on this record, to displace our common perception that attorney's fees should not
be charged against ERISA plaintiffs."); Nachwalter v Christie,805 F2d 956,962 (11th Cir 1986)
(explaining that courts should refrain from "charging fees against ERISA beneficiaries since private actions by beneficiaries seeking in good faith to secure their rights under employee benefit
plans are important mechanisms for furthering ERISA's remedial purpose").
See Gray v New England Telephone and Telegraph Co, 792 F2d 251, 259 (1st Cir 1986)
("Factors may simply not weigh equally where defendants rather than plaintiffs seek fees."). See
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to pay the defendants' attorneys' fees in cases where the plaintiffs'
claims clearly lacked substance or were abusive."
B.

Definitions for Prevailing Party
While the idea that only prevailing parties should receive ERISA

attorneys' fees is widely accepted, it is still unclear what it means for a
party to have prevailed.n In other words, to what extent must a party

win its case in order to be considered prevailing? In some situations,
this question can be extremely difficult. If parties to an 1SA action
settle the case before trial, which party, if any, is the prevailing party?
Other situations, such as the completion of a trial with a verdict, are
normally easier to resolve. Even then, however, courts still must determine whether a party has won enough from the verdict to be con-

sidered prevailing. Must a prevailing party win all of its claims or just a
substantial portion? Is it enough for a party to win only one of its
principal claims? Some courts have addressed these problems, but
there is no established or consistent standard for determining the prevailing party in ERISA litigation.5'
also Berlind, 71 Cornell L Rev at 1046 (cited in note 19) (finding that Eaves factors "can rarely
be used to assess fees against a losing plaintiff"). However, the Bittner test is neutral between
plaintiffs and defendants. See Bittner,728 F2d at 829 ("ERISA does not create a presumption in
favor of a prevailing plaintiff's request for fees and against a prevailing defendant's.").
" See Little, 71 F3d at 644-45 (awarding attorneys' fees to the defendant because the plaintiff produced no evidence backing her claims and established no genuine issue of material fact
"despite considerable discovery"); Operating Engineers Pension Trust v Gilliam, 737 F2d 1501,
1506 (9th Cir 1984) (granting the defendant's request for attorneys' fees because "the prosecution of this suit was grossly unfair"). The main reason why courts have allowed defendants to recover attorneys' fees in some ERISA cases is because they wanted to discourage plaintiffs from
initiating frivolous lawsuits in bad faith. On the other hand, courts have also wanted to be careful
not to punish plaintiffs too harshly for starting lawsuits that seemed reasonable at the beginning,
but failed for whatever reason. See Berlind, 71 Cornell L Rev at 1046 (cited in note 19).
The complexities of winning and losing in litigation can make it extremely difficult to
identify prevailing parties. Consider the following view:
Many fee-shifting cases do not involve simple two-party, single-issue lawsuits. Plaintiffs may
win some but not all of their substantive claims, receive some but not all of the remedy
sought, or attain some but not all of their collateral aims. When they do realize their goals, it
may not be by verdict and judgment, but by settlement or by legislative or administrative
action. Determining whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party for fee-shifting purposes is often difficult.
Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney FeesAgainst Adversaries:Introducingthe Problem,1986 Duke
L J 435, 449-50.
' In addition to the two standards discussed in this Comment, a small number of courts have
applied independent standards to determine whether the party requesting fee shifting was a
qualified prevailing party. One court allowed fee shifting even though the party receiving the attorneys' fees lost some of its arguments on appeal, because the party had won enough benefits
before the appeal to be considered a prevailing party. See Sokol v Bernstein, 812 F2d 559, 561
(9th Cir 1987). In cases where the litigants seeking fees won some of their claims, courts have
identified the parties as only partially prevailing and have awarded reduced attorneys' fees accordingly. See Downey Community Hospital v Wilson, 977 F2d 470,474 (9th Cir 1992) (refusing
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1. The Hooper test.
Federal courts have proposed different tests to identify which
ERISA litigants are prevailing parties. The Seventh Circuit proposed
one solution in Hooper v Demco, Inc that has received some support
from other courts.!" In Hooper, a cancer patient sued his former employer after he was denied coverage under the employee health plan
for the costs of a controversial chemotherapy treatment.6 Shortly after
the lawsuit was filed, the parties entered into a settlement agreement
in which the defendant helped the plaintiff find money for the treatment from other sources.57 The plaintiff sought recovery of attorneys'
fees on the basis that he effectively had "won" the benefits he sought.'
Noting that ERISA attorneys' fees ordinarily should be awarded
only to prevailing parties, the Hooper court first observed that not
every settlement situation will produce a prevailing party because litigants sometimes settle for reasons unrelated to the substance and issues of a case. 9 Consequently, parties in ERISA lawsuits must satisfy
two conditions to prove that they have prevailed. First, a litigant must
prove that her lawsuit was a material factor in obtaining relief. Second, a litigant must demonstrate that she accomplished the goals of
her lawsuit on the strength of the merits of her case.1 Applying these
conditions to the case in Hooper,the court found that the plaintiff was
not a prevailing party because he never presented a credible case and
received relief only due to the charitable acts of the defendant.6
to award attorneys' fees for costs associated with parts of lawsuit that did not result in ERISA
benefits); Cefali v Buffalo Brass Co, Inc, 748 F Supp 1011, 1019 (W D NY 1990) (reducing
amount of fee shifting because the "plaintiffs achieved only partial success at best"). The alternative tests introduced by these cases represent unusual departures from the mainstream jurisprudence of ERISA fee shifting. For the most part, courts do not follow these rules. Accordingly, the
discussion here does not require more than a comparison between the legal merits test and the
catalyst test-the two central standards that courts most often choose between when deciding
whether to award attorneys' fees under ERISA.
37 F3d 287 (7th Cir 1994).
See Phelps v US West, Inc,1998 US App LEXIS 6667, *8-10 (10th Cir) (applying Hooper
to determine the prevailing party in a health benefits case); Davis v Wal-Mart Stores,Inc, 1999
US Dist LEXIS 15281, *31-36 (D Kan) (same).
"See Hooper,37 F3d at 288-90.
Id at 290-91.
Id at 291.
Id at 292 ("A suit may be groundless, and settled for its nuisance value, or settled by a
party for wholly gratuitous reasons, thus not justifying an award of attorney's fees.").
Id.
Id at 293.
The Hooper court specifically pointed out that the evidence overwhelmingly vindicated
the defendant's refusal to pay for the costs of the "experimental" and "investigative" treatment.
The court also praised the defendant's efforts to secure help for the plaintiff outside of the
health plan coverage. Id at 294 ("Further, gratuitous donations to aid a dying person cannot and
does [sic] not rise to the level of satisfying the standard of prevailing party in an ERISA law-

suit.").
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2. The catalyst test.

Other courts have come up with different approaches to determining whether a party has prevailed in ERISA litigation. Some have
applied a simple catalyst test, asking whether the litigant's victory was

caused by her efforts in the lawsuit.6 This means that there must be
some sort of causal relationship between the relief obtained and the
litigation." Typically, litigants have satisfied the catalyst test if they
were better off after the ERISA lawsuit than they were before.65The
threshold for showing gains from litigation is low, and courts have
considered parties to have prevailed even where the litigant gained no
actual benefits and instead won only the right to see certain documents about a retirement plan66 or the right to be notified about reasons for the denial of benefits. The threshold for establishing causa-

For background and a description of the catalyst test, see Joel H. Trotter, Note, The
Catalyst Theory of Civil Rights Fee Shifting After Farrar v. Hobby, 80 Va L Rev 1429,1433-37 (1994).
See also Laura E. Flenniken, No More Plain Meaning: Farrar v. Hobby, 71 Denver U L Rev 477,
479 & n 12 (1994) (explaining the catalyst test). In a sense, the catalyst test is synonymous with a
"but for" test of causation. See Milton v Shalala, 17 F3d 812,813-14 (5th Cir 1994) (describing a
case in which "a claimant's law suit was a necessary cause of the favorable redetermination of
the claimant's rights, providing a catalyst for the restoration of benefits ...[and as a result] the
court found a sufficient link between the litigation and the restoration of benefits to justify characterizing the claimant as a party succeeding in litigation" and stating that "[t]his rationale has
also been called the 'but for' causation theory"). Under this test, a party can become a prevailing
party even by obtaining relief outside of litigation. See id at 814-15 ("This theory recognizes that
though a claimant may not succeed in court if a settlement or remedial action renders the law
suit moot, he may nonetheless be considered a prevailing party if his law suit was a catalyst in attaining remedial action."). See also Walling v Brady, 1997 US Dist LEXIS 17205, *3 n 2 (D Del)
("[w]hen a plaintiff 'obtains some of the benefit sought through a settlement she is a prevailing
party and will be entitled to a fee award unless the court finds it to be an exceptional case."').
. See McManus v Gitano Group,Inc,59 F3d 382,384 (2d Cir 1995) ("Recovery of
fees on a
catalyst theory requires an applicant to demonstrate a causal connection between the litigation
and the recovery of benefits."); Cefali v Buffalo Brass Co, Inc, 748 F Supp 1011, 1017-18 (W D
NY 1990) (finding that a causal connection between the relief obtained and the litigation in
which the fees are sought exists if the suit was a catalytic factor in attaining the relief); Petro v
Flintkote Co, 633 F Supp 10,11 (N D Ohio 1986) ("[A] plaintiff may qualify as a prevailing party
if the lawsuit is casually [sic] related to securing the relief obtained.").
See Algie v RCA Global Communications Inc,891 F Supp 870,890 (S D NY 1994) (recognizing the plaintiff as the prevailing party for winning a single claim out of six), affd, 60 F3d 956
(2d Cir 1995); Cefali, 748 F Supp at 1018 (awarding attorneys' fees to the plaintiff who had recovered some benefits through settlement); Petro, 633 F Supp at 11 ("Plaintiffs achieved some of
the benefit in bringing their ERISA claim, and are therefore entitled to reasonable attorneys'
fees under 29 USC § 1132(g)."). Sometimes, courts also apply the catalyst test without expressly
indicating that they are doing so. See O'Rourke v Pitney Bowes; Inc, 1997 US Dist LEXIS 17929,
*9-10 (S D NY) (recognizing plaintiff as prevailing party because the lawsuit brought about
some of the benefits sought).
" See Groves v Modified Retirement Plan for Hourly Paid Employees of Johns Manville
Corp, 803 F2d 109,119 (3d Cir 1986).
" See Christianv Dupont-WaynesboroHealth Care CoveragePlan, 12 F Supp 2d 535,537-38
(W D Va 1998).
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tion is also easy to meet, and plaintiffs have satisfied the catalyst test
in some cases by the simple fact that they filed a lawsuit.6
III. ADOPTINGA MORE SENSIBLE STANDARD: IDENTIFYING
PREVAILING PARTIES THROUGH CONSIDERATIONS OF

LEGAL MERITS

This Part argues that the federal courts should abandon the catalyst test as a means for defining the prevailing party under ERISA fee
shifting. Instead, they should embrace the premise of the Hooper
test-that the substance of what a party argues in litigation is relevant
to whether it becomes eligible to receive attorneys' fees-and craft a
legal rule that considers legal merits in the prevailing party determination. The legal merits test has both doctrinal and policy advantages
over the catalyst test. Doctrinally, the legal merits test allows the definition of prevailing party to comport with other rules of ERISA fee
shifting and creates a better fit for ERISA fee shifting in the universe
of fee shifting provisions under federal law. From a policy perspective,
the legal merits test better promotes efficiency in the ERISA litigation
process than the catalyst test. By holding parties to a higher standard,
the legal merits test correspondingly creates incentives for parties to
seek welfare-enhancing settlements and allows courts to save valuable
judicial resources.
A. A Proposal for the Legal Merits Test
The federal courts should reject the catalyst test and look at the
merits of the case presented by the party requesting attorneys' fees.
Under the proposed legal merits test, a party that succeeds with a
strong and persuasive ERISA claim would qualify as a prevailing
party whereas a party with a dubious claim would not. To make this
determination, courts should look to strengths of the arguments advanced by the party seeking attorneys' fees. For example, courts can
take into account whether a party has exposed the error of her opponent,0 or whether a party has proved the validity of her claims.7 The
legal merits test argues for eschewing the precept of the catalyst test-

See Hamilton v Bank of New York (Delaware), 1995 US Dist LEXIS 10464, *12-13 (D
Del) ("[T]he filing of suit appears to have precipitated defendants' reversal of eligibility determination for plaintiff which also indicates that plaintiff has prevailed.").
See Perlman v Swiss Bank Corp Comprehensive DisabilityProtection Plan, 990 F Supp
1039,1041 (N D 1 1998) (ruling that the plaintiff prevailed because she convinced the court that
the defendant wrongfully denied her ERISA benefits).
" See Painterv Golden Rule Insurance Co, 121 F3d 436, 441 (8th Cir 1997) (denying prevailing party status to the plaintiff because she did not prove the validity of her claims and won
only on procedural grounds).
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that winning anything is sufficient to establish a party as prevailing.1
Courts should instead distinguish between parties that win based on
the merits of their case and parties that win due to technicalities. Es-

sentially, the legal merits test moves courts away from a purely technical understanding of what it means to "come out ahead" from a lawsuit, and instead has courts consider honestly whether the party seek-

ing attorneys' fees actually deserves them.7
In a sense, some courts already take into account legal merits
when they decide prevailing party questions, although they do so with
varying degrees of explicitness. In Hooper v Demco, Inc,.7 the court
considered the strength of the plaintiff's case when it held that the

plaintiff did not satisfy the prevailing party requirement because the
defendant had settled the case gratuitously.74 Other courts have used
the same sort of evaluation in the non-settlement context. 7 In Perlman
v Swiss Bank Corp Comprehensive Disability Protection Plan,7 6 the

court, after concluding that the plaintiff had succeeded on one of her
claims, held that the plaintiff met the requirements to be a prevailing
party by showing that the defendant had violated ERISA.n In contrast, the court in Quinn v Blue Cross and Blue Shield Corp7 declined

to treat the plaintiff as a prevailing party, even though she had technically won her case, because she failed to demonstrate convincingly
that the defendant acted without justification.
See notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
Although it may seem that this standard invites courts to impose their own sense of desert, it actually does not. The development of precedents for what constitutes meritorious claims
will certainly constrain courts to a degree. Indeed, by making the merits determination explicit,
the proposed test should establish rules that limit discretion much in the same way as the Eaves
factors. See note 18 and accompanying text.
37 F3d 287.
Id at 293. See also Sullivan v Gavin, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 3981, *7-8 (N D Ill) (applying
the Hooper test to deny a plaintiff status as a prevailing party because it was not the merits of
the plaintiff's case that led the defendant to act); Davis v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 1999 US Dist
LEXIS 15281, *35 (D Kan) ("However, she has not shown that the Plan paid her benefits based
solely on the strength of her case.").
See Painterv Golden Rule Insurance Co,121 F3d at 441 (stating that the plaintiff was not
a prevailing party because she only won in the sense that the defendant admitted a procedural
error in its declaratory judgment motion); FirstNational Bank of Chicago v Retirement Trust for
Employees of the Standard Oil Co and Subsidiaries,1992 US Dist LEXIS 5662, *5 (N D Ill)
("Prevailing parties are usually those who succeed on the substantive merits and not merely on
procedural claims."). See also Spellman v Aetna Plywood, Inc,1991 US Dist LEXIS 6489, *9 (N
D Ill) (declining to award attorneys' fees because neither party successfully proved the other
party's case "unmeritorious").
990 F Supp 1039 (N D IM1998).
Id at 1041 ("I find that Ms. Perlman is a prevailing party. Ms. Pelman filed suit seeking to
overturn the denial of her disability benefits. I found that UNUM's denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious.").
161 F3d 472 (7th Cir 1998).
Id at 478-79 ("While Quinn may be a 'prevailing party' in that she will have her case remanded, she is not a prevailing party in the truest sense of the word.... [W]e are not convinced
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What the proposed legal merits test does, then, is to set up as an
explicit standard what some courts already implicitly apply. The legal
merits test differs slightly from the Hooper test in that it has applications outside the context of ERISA settlements. The legal merits test
also varies somewhat from the analysis in Perlman and Quinn because
the proposed test will require courts to speak directly about the basis
of their conclusions. Some examples illustrate more clearly how the
legal merits test might operate. In the settlement context, this test
could exclude a party who argued frivolous positions and successfully
settled the case only for the nuisance value.n° It also could bar a party
that came out ahead on its lawsuit only because the lawsuit prompted
some uninvolved third party to step in with relief.8 ' Similarly, in the
context where judgment is reached, the legal merits test could bar a
party who simply prevailed on procedural grounds8
There are two reasons why courts should adopt the legal merits
test. First, the proposed test brings the ERISA definition for prevailing party in line with the definition for the same term suggested by the
Supreme Court in the civil rights context and makes the process of determining the prevailing party more internally consistent with other
aspects of ERISA jurisprudence. Second, by looking at the merits to
determine whether to award attorneys' fees, courts can promote more
efficient behavior in ERISA litigation by encouraging settlements
where they are rational and by conserving judicial resources.
B.

Fitting the ERISA Fee Shifting Doctrine Within the Framework
of Existing Law

The legal merits test is doctrinally superior to the catalyst test in
two ways. First, the legal merits test allows ERISA fee shifting to follow better the developments in federal law that implicate how courts
should define the prevailing party. In contrast, the catalyst test puts
ERISA fee shifting in conflict with the direction of changing law. Second, the legal merits test makes more sense within the context of
other rules involved in ERISA fee shifting. It creates a better fit between the test of eligibility and the test of appropriateness for awarding attorneys' fees under ERISA.
that Blue Cross' position was totally lacking in justification nor is there any evidence that Blue
Cross acted in bad faith.").
, See Poteete v Capital Engineering, Inc, 1999 US App LEXIS 16789, *5-6 (7th Cir)

("Moreover, if a suit is frivolous, and settled merely for its nuisance value, the plaintiff is not
even a prevailing party in the technical sense.").

. See Hooper,37 F3d at 291 (evaluating whether a party who received charitable aid from
"a number of people and organizations unrelated to the parties in the lawsuit" can count as a
prevailing party).
See Cefali v Buffalo Brass Co,748 F Supp 1011,1019 (W D NY 1990) (considering a peti-

tion for fee shifting from a party who presented "misguided and unproductive" claims).
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1. Alignment with Farrar.
The Supreme Court, in Farrarv Hobby,n issued a ruling that implicates the proper standard for prevailing party under ERISA. In that
case, the Court considered the petition of a civil rights plaintiff who
requested fee shifting after winning only one dollar from his lawsuit

for seventeen million dollars. The Supreme Court determined that alM he nonetheless dethough the plaintiff prevailed in a technical sense,8
served nothing in attorneys' fees because he failed to prove the merits

of his case. It held that "to qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights
plaintiff must obtain some relief on the merits of his claim. The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from
whom fees are sought, or comparable relief through a consent decree

or settlement."'
The decision in Farrarsignals a departure from the catalyst test in
favor of a more stringent standard that takes into account the merits
of the case argued by the fee-seeking party in the context of civil
rights litigation. In response to Farrar,at least one circuit has explicitly abandoned the catalyst testM and other courts have expressed re-

luctance to treat a party with a weak case as a prevailing party. For
example, in Poteete v CapitalEngineering,Inc,91 the court held that
506 US 103 (1992).
See id at 105-09 (describing the facts of the case).
Id at 112.
Id at 115 ("When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove
an essential element of his claim for monetary reliet the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at
all.") (citations omitted).
Id at 111 (citations omitted).
See PG. Szczepanski, Note, For a Few DollarsLess: Equity Rides Again in the Denial of
Section 1988 Attorney's Fees to a PrevailingPlaintiffin Farrar v. Hobby, 5 Temple Polit & Civ Rts
L Rev 219,219 (1996) ("Farrarhas also been interpreted as having eliminated the catalyst theory
under which many civil rights plaintiffs are awarded Section 1988 fees."); Trotter, 80 Va L Rev at
1446 (cited in note 63) ("Although the Court did not address Farrar'simplications for catalytic
recovery, the actual consequence of the decision still seems inescapable: A plaintiff can no longer
prevail through the catalyst theory alone.").
See Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee v Beasley, 99 F3d 134, 136 (4th
Cir
1996) (noting that the catalyst test no longer applied after Farrar),cert denied, 520 US 1166
(1997). See also S-1 and S-2 by and through P-1 and P-2 v State Board of Education of North
Carolina,6 F3d 160, 168-69 (4th Cir 1993) (Wilkinson dissenting) ("There is no way, however,
that Farrarand a broad 'catalyst theory' of attorneys' fees recovery can be reconciled."), adopted
as the opinion of the court upon rehearing en banc, 21 F3d 49,51 (4th Cir 1994) (per curiam). For
a general background of S-1 and S-2, see Martin Patrick Averill, "Specters" and "LitigiousFog"?:
The Fourth CircuitAbandons Catalyst Theory in S-1 and S-2 by and through P-1 and P-2 v. State
Board of Education of North Carolina, 73 NC L Rev 2245,2247-51 (1995).
See NAACP, DetroitBranch v DetroitPolice Officers Association,46 F3d 528,530
(6th Cir
1995) (citing S-1 and S-2 for the proposition that a plaintiff arguing a case without merits cannot
recover attorneys' fees); Hooper,37 F3d at 295 (Manion concurring) (noting that Farrarchanged
the requirements for a prevailing party). But see Marbley v Bane, 57 F3d 224,234 (2d Cir 1995)
(arguing that Farrardoes not invalidate the catalyst test); Zinn v Shalala,35 F3d 273,276 (7th Cir
1994) (indicating the continuing viability of the catalyst test after Farrar);Craigv Gregg County,
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[t]here is no novelty in distinguishing between a party in whose
favor judgment is rendered and a party who obtains meaningful
relief A plaintiff who sues for $1 billion and receives a judgment
for 1 is technically the prevailing party, but he will be awarded
zero attorneys' fees under a statute that makes the award of fees
to a prevailing party a matter of course. Moreover, if a suit is
frivolous, and settled merely for its nuisance value, the plaintiff is
not even a prevailing party in a technical sense.92
Farrarenhances the doctrinal basis for adopting the legal merits
test in ERISA fee shifting. Both Farrarand the proposed test focus on
the merits of the underlying claim when determining whether a party
is prevailing and entitled to receive attorneys' fees. It might not be
clear at first, however, why a rule under civil rights law should have
anything to do with the definition of prevailing party under ERISA.
After all, courts applying ERISA fee shifting in the past have strenuously resisted analogizing ERISA with civil rights laws for the purpose of finding a presumption favoring the recovery of fees.93 There
are two reasons why Farrarshould guide the prevailing party standard
for ERISA. First, to the extent that attorneys' fees should be awarded
more liberally under civil rights laws,94 it does not make any sense for
ERISA to have more lenient requirements for the prevailing party.
With Farraras a point of reference for civil rights laws, the prevailing
party test under ERISA should be at least as demanding if not more
SO.

Second, while the substantive policy differences between civil
rights laws and ERISA justifies having different presumptions for fee
shifting, it does not require dissimilar definitions for the prevailing
issuedifferent
such as this
one,
party.'
There term-prevailing
is no reason why, party-should
on a definitionalmean
an identical
things.9'

Texas, 988 F2d 18,21 (5th Cir 1993) (acknowledging the conflict between Farrarand the catalyst

test).
1999 US App LEXIS 16789 (7th Cir).
Id at *5-6 (citations omitted).
See Phelps, 64 Geo Wash L Rev at 851 (cited in note 11) (commenting that some courts

"find the analogy to civil rights statutes inappropriate for ERISA fee award determinations").
See also Armistead v Venitron Corp, 944 F2d 1287,1302-03 (6th Cir 1991) (declining to import a

presumption for fee shifting from civil rights statutes to ERISA); Gray v New England Telephone and Telegraph Co, 792 F2d 251,259 (1st Cir 1986) (declaring that the presumption favor-

ing fee shifting under litigation involving civil rights statutes does not apply to ERISA).
See Armistead, 944 F2d at 1303 (holding that ERISA lacks the same level of public importance as civil rights litigation and should have a less liberal standard for fee shifting).

See Perlman,990 F Supp at 1041 ("In ERISA cases, a 'prevailing party' is determined using the same standard set forth under 42 USC § 1988.").
See Phelps, 64 Geo Wash L Rev at 850 (cited in note 11) ("Although no such explicit legislative history is available for ERISA's fee shifting provision, the statutory language is nearly
identical to civil rights law."); Bertino, 41 Cath U L Rev at 877-78 (cited in note 8) (observing
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These same reasons demonstrate why courts should reject the catalyst
test. Under the catalyst test, ERISA fee shifting would have a more
lenient standard than civil rights fee shifting, contrary to the ordering

of policy objectives expressed by courts. Also, the catalyst test would
create a situation where similar terms have disparate meaning under
different laws, even though these terms operate for the same purpose.
In sum, the courts should choose the legal merits test over the catalyst
test simply because it is more consistent with federal law after Farrar.

2. Internal consistency.
At the outset, an argument can be made that the courts should

adopt the legal merits test simply because it provides for a better alternative to the lack of uniformity in the status quo. Compared to the
current state in which courts apply different and contradicting tests
for determining the prevailing party," commitment to any uniform
rule might conceivably enhance some rule of law quality of ERISA

fee shifting.9 But this argument is not extremely convincing-it offers
no reasons to specifically choose the legal merits test over any other
rule. Generally, the legal merits test offers two advantages over the
catalyst test for identifying the prevailing party. First, it conforms better with the statutory text of the ERISA fee shifting provision. Second, the legal merits test allows for more consistency between the

definition of prevailing party and the Eaves factors.
One well accepted canon of statutory interpretation stipulates
that any reading of a law should not contradict the law's textual lan-

guage.' In terms of the ERISA fee shifting provision, the language of
the statute clearly leaves open the possibility that courts will award atthat civil rights statutes allow fee shifting to both plaintiffs and defendants in a way similar to
ERISA).
See note 94 and accompanying text.
See Part II.B.
See J. Harvie Wilkinson II, Toward a Jurisprudenceof Presumptions,67 NYU L Rev 907,
908 (1992) (noting the advantages of clear rather than conflicted and confused law); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., and Phillip P. Frickey,Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning,42 Stan L Rev
321,339 (1990) (arguing for the appeal of the rule of law value that people should know the law);
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,56 U Chi L Rev 1175,1179 (1989) ("Even in
simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of Law."); Richard
A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisisand Reform 248 (Harvard 1985) (explaining that the law
cannot "induce people to behave in particular ways ... if it is constantly changing directions").
" See ConnecticutNationalBank v Germain,503 US 249,253-54 (1992) (indicating that the
canons of construction disfavor interpretations that make language in a statute superfluous and
commenting that the text of a law should be followed whenever it is unambiguous). See also Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation Federal Courts and the Law 16 (Princeton 1997)
("[W]hen the text of the statute is clear, that is the end of the matter."); Scalia, 56 U Chi L Rev at
1183 (cited in note 99) (arguing that judges must always find some basis for their interpretations
in the text of the law); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,50 U Chi L Rev 533, 544-51
(1983) (advocating the "clear statement" principle in statutory interpretation).
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torneys' fees to either the plaintiff or the defendant."" Accordingly, interpretive convention demands that the prevailing party standard al-

lows for both parties to have a chance at recovering the cost of their
fees. The catalyst test fails this condition because it precludes the de-

fendant from successfully petitioning for fees. Under the catalyst test,
the party seeking fees must demonstrate that it took some action that
caused a realization of gain.' ° The ERISA defendant, by the nature of

her position on the defense, often has a hard time making this showing. What serves as an easy test for the plaintiff then poses a tremendous challenge for the defendant. 'u In contrast, the legal merits test

relies only on an examination of the strength of the fee-seeking
party's case, and does not have a bias against the plaintiff or the de-

fendant. Even though the ERISA fee shifting policy discourages
awarding the defendant attorneys' fees in many instances, the legal

merits test is nonetheless a more appropriate standard because it at
least maintains the possibility that the defendant might obtain recovery of fees,'" preserving cohesion between the text of the law and the

applied standard.
The legal merits test also offers greater consistency with the
Eaves factors. ' The catalyst test presents a very minimal barrier to the

party seeking to qualify as a prevailing party, and it almost never
eliminates fee applicants from the process." Applying this test, courts
frequently create the strange situation in which they consider a party's
" See 29 USC § 1132(g)(1) (authorizing courts to award "a reasonable attorneys' fee and
costs of action to either party"). See also Little v Cox's Supermarket, 71 F3d 637, 644 (7th Cir
1995) (awarding attorneys' fees to defendant under ERISA); Gray v New England Telephone &
Telegraph Co, 792 F2d 251, 258-59 (1st Cir 1986) (stating that ERISA attorneys' fees can be
awarded to the defendant as well as to the plaintiff).
" See McManus v Gitano Group,Inc,59 F3d 382,384 (2d Cir 1995) (arguing that fee shifting
requires a demonstration of causation between the litigation and the obtaining of some benefit);
Hamilton v Bank of New York (Delaware),1995 US Dist LEXIS 10464, *12-13 (D Del) (finding
that the plaintiff's decision to sue was causal in the recovery of benefits); Petro v Flintkote Co,
633 F Supp 10,11 (N D Ohio 1986) ("[A] plaintiff may qualify as a prevailing pariy if the lawsuit
is casually [sic] related to securing the relief obtained.").
- See Dobbs, 1986 Duke L J at 450 (cited in note 52) ("Most federal courts have used a
'generous formulation' to give the plaintiff prevailing party status."); Trotter, 80 Va L Rev at 1436
(cited in note 63) (commenting that the catalyst test is almost always applied for plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees from defendants).
See Glennie v Abitibi-PriceCorp, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 13366, *2-5 (W D Mich) ("Defendants, as prevailing parties in this lawsuit, may be awarded their costs... [B]ecause defendants
prevailed, the relative merits of their positions weighs in favor of an award of costs.").
For a review of the Eaves factors, see text accompanying note 23.
Virtually any plaintiff can show that it prevailed under the catalyst test by showing that it
obtained some relief after the commencement of its lawsuit. See Trotter, 80 Va L Rev at 1439-40
(cited in note 63) (explaining that the catalyst test can be satisfied even if the lawsuit resulted in
"change merely because administrators preferred to avoid the nuisance and expense of litigation"); Dobbs, 1986 Duke L J at 453 (cited in note 52) (noting that courts have found some plaintiffs to be prevailing parties even when the relief obtained came not from defendants, but from
an administrative or legislative act).
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petition for fee shifting even though the party has no realistic chance
of obtaining attorneys' fees. This is a wasteful use of judicial resources
and a meaningless exercise. The legal merits test is superior then in
that it allows a better filtering of candidates for fee shifting. While not
every party who passes the legal merits test will satisfy the Eaves factors-even the most meritorious party cannot recover, after all, if the
other party has no ability to pay-the legal merits test at least does a
better job of clearing out those parties that clearly have no prospect of
recovering fees.
C.

Encouraging Settlements and Judicial Savings

As a consequence of choosing the legal merits test over the catalyst test, fewer litigants will qualify to receive attorneys' fees. This result certainly seems logical. The legal merits test poses a greater barrier for the party seeking compensation of fees. Applying the proposed test, courts must consider the merits of the claims argued by the
party requesting attorneys' fees. In contrast, under the catalyst test the
party seeking fees need only show that she benefited as a result of the
litigation process.07
Consider the facts of Hooper.Depending on the test employed by
the court, two outcomes are possible. If the Hooper court had adhered
to the catalyst test, it could have concluded that the plaintiff satisfied
the standard for prevailing party. By looking to the legal merits of
the case argued by the plaintiff, however, the Hooper court resolved
that the plaintiff in fact should not be eligible for fee shifting.'9 The
decision in Quinn accommodates a similar analysis. Like Hooper,the
Quinn court could have found that the plaintiff met the prevailing
party requirement if it had applied the catalyst test. ° Instead, the
court in Quinn looked beyond what the plaintiff technically achieved
and held that the plaintiff had not made a sufficiently convincing
showing of the merits of her case to entitle her to fees."1'
The more rigorous standard of the legal merits test points to two
reasons for adopting it and rejecting the catalyst test. First, by de" See McManus v Gitano Group,Inc, 59 F3d 382,384 (2d Cir 1995) ("Recovery of fees on a
catalyst theory requires an applicant to demonstrate a causal connection between the litigation
and the recovery of benefits."). See also Trotter, 80 Va L Rev at 1433-37 (cited in note 63) (detailing the general description and background of the catalyst test).
Hooper,37 F3d at 292 (conceding the possibility that the plaintiff caused the recovery by
initiating an ERISA lawsuit).

- Id at 294-95 (noting that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate evidentiary support for
his case and that the defendant offered to help the plaintiff gratuitously).

- Quinn, 161 F3d at 479 (suggesting that the plaintiff prevailed in her case "in some sense of
the term").
Id at 478-79 (holding that the plaintiff did not persuasively show that her case had suffi-

cient legal merits).
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manding more from the party seeking attorneys' fees, the legal merits
test affects the decision of ERISA litigants to settle. Specifically, the
more difficult conditions make it harder for a party to qualify as a
prevailing party and lower the overall expectation for fee shifting.
Such a reduction in the general prospects for awards of attorneys' fees
compels ERISA litigants to alter their settlement calculus, leading
them more often to choose to settle cases when efficiency dictates.
Second, the legal merits test limits the wasteful consumption of legal
resources by filtering out the volume of illegitimate parties that courts
must consider for fee shifting.
1. Encouraging efficient settlements.
In the course of ordinary settlement negotiations, the parties
communicate information about the relative strengths of their positions through their offers or demands."2 This posturing tends to improve the chances of reaching a compromise. As parties make offers
or demands, they send signals that mitigate the possibility of false confidence preventing settlement. Of course, not all parties communicate truthfully. Some might misrepresent their positions by offering
less or demanding more than their case deserves in the hopes that this
bluffing will mislead their opponents into greater concessions.' 14 Issuing false signals in such instances undermines the settlement process
and can result in wasteful delays or failures in bargaining."s
Fee shifting exacerbates the problem of bluffing by increasing the
signal strength of parties who choose to negotiate dishonestly. The
availability of attorneys' fees allows the bluffing party not only to
communicate her belief about winning the case, but her certainty in
prevailing in the fee dispute, effectively raising the amount at stake."6
- See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 608 (Aspen 5th ed 1998) (describing

settlement as a process in which parties signal to each other how confident they feel about their
respective cases to lend credibility to their demands and offers).
10See id ("[T]he settlement process itself is likely to reduce the divergence of estimates.");
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 486 (Scott, Foresman 1988) ("Thus, one

source of trials is optimism: when parties think they will win at trial, neither will concede when
bargaining.").

- See A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introductionto Law and Economics 112-13 (Little, Brown
2d

ed 1989) (arguing that parties may act strategically and bluff in settlement negotiations).

1. See Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46 Vand L Rev

1069,1084-85 (1993) (noting that bluffing by parties trying to capture a larger portion of the settlement surplus can lead to negotiation failures); Eric Talley, Liability-Based Fee-Shifting Rules
and Settlement Mechanisms Under Incomplete Information, 71 Chi Kent L Rev 461,465 (1995)

("This incentive to misrepresent one's private information can be wasteful, for it increases the
probability of bargaining failure or delay, even when it is obvious to all that there are immediate
gains from settlement.").
- See Talley, 71 Chi Kent L Rev at 466 (cited in note 115) ("Now, the bluffing party signals
information not only about the relative strength of her case, but also about the likelihood that
she will ultimately have to bear litigation costs.") (emphasis omitted).
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While fee shifting does not modify the incentives of parties to bluff

per se, it certainly makes the problem of bluffing more serious because it fosters greater divergence in the parties' offers and demands

and increases the possibility of settlement failure.'"
Although the statutory fee shifting provision under ERISA

means that the opportunity for awarding attorneys' fees will always
exist to some degree in ERISA litigation, the legal merits test lessens

the adverse impact that fee shifting can have on settlements. By making the prevailing party standard more demanding and reducing the
general expectation of fee shifting,"g the legal merits test eliminates
some of the transaction costs that block parties from settling cases be-

cause courts can remove from consideration for fee shifting those parties with unmeritorious claims. 9 Thus, the legal merits test eliminates
fee shifting as a factor in a significant portion of the cases.' 20In con-

trast, the catalyst test preserves the possibility of fee shifting for a

It is possible that fee shifting could even encourage bluffing in the ERISA context, at least
for the plaintiff with an unmeritorious case. Such a plaintiff, understanding that the courts would
be unlikely to award attorneys' fees to the defendant under ERISA, might consider the costs of a
failed negotiation (going to trial) the same as the costs for accepting an unfavorable settlement.
In such a situation, the plaintiff with weak claims might opt to bluff aggressively because she
faces a low probability of having to pay for this strategy. See id at 466 & n 17 (arguing that a
weak party will choose to bluff because the truth would force it to accept an unfavorable settlement anyway).
See notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
Although it may initially appear ambitious to expect courts to distinguish between meritorious and frivolous cases, it is actually not so difficult for courts to do so in practice. Indeed,
courts already make such distinctions as a matter of course in many other contexts of law. See,
for example, Cooter & Gell v Hartmarx Corp, 496 US 384,393 (1990) (identifying certain kinds
of cases as "baseless"); Hayduk v Lanna, 775 F2d 441, 444 (1st Cir 1985) (concluding that the
plaintiff filed a frivolous securities fraud lawsuit); Semegen v Weidner, 780 F2d 727,731 (9th Cir
1985) (same). While it must be acknowledged that courts will have a harder time making a determination of frivolousness in some cases, there is nonetheless little reason to believe that
courts cannot perform that task. For a general discussion, see A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Sanctioning FrivolousSuits: An Economic Analysis, 82 Georgetown L J 397 (1993);
William C Baskin III, Note, Using Rule 9(b) to Reduce Nuisance SecuritiesLitigation, 99 Yale L J
1591 (1990); John W. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation:A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural
Sanctions,14 Hofstra L Rev 433 (1986).
. Of course, there is no way to compute with precision just how many fee applicants the legal merits test would filter out. At the very least, the legal merits test would qualify fewer candidates for fee shifting than the catalyst test and should produce some relative gains. See notes 8082 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the legal merits test facilitates settlement in
the cases where the parties most often avoid litigation. Parties should choose settlement in cases
that do not involve mutual optimism, that is, cases where one party has a much stronger or more
meritorious position. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 610 (cited in note 112) ("In general, then, litigation will occur only if both parties are optimistic about the outcome of the litigation."). The legal merits test most effectively precludes fee shifting from imposing transaction
costs on settlements for these types of cases by making it clear that the party with the corresponding unmeritorious position has no chance of receiving attorneys' fees.
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larger pool of candidates and leaves open the opportunity for fee

shifting to derail settlement negotiations121
The legal merits test reduces the problem of transaction costs in
two ways.' First, it diminishes the grounds for disagreement or concern over liability for fees that can potentially prevent parties from
settling cases.'2 Accordingly, the legal merits test allows ERISA litigants to settle cases with only nuisance value or to act charitably
without having to worry that such decisions will expose them to fee
shifting later.M
Second, the legal merits test reduces the transaction costs associated with bluffing as a bargaining strategy. Bluffing becomes a less effective strategy when courts take into account the legal merits of the
underlying claim in awarding attorneys' fees. Litigants can still opt to
misrepresent the strengths of their cases, but the signal they communicate would carry substantially less meaning because the courts in
every case will apply an independent review of the merits.'2 Knowing
that the courts will require a more rigorous standard for fee shifting,
parties will take less seriously threats by their opponents that the

courts will award attorneys' fees in their favor. In contrast, the catalyst
test still provides opportunity for bluffing parties to try to scare their

opponents into conceding to favorable settlements because the courts
See note 117 and accompanying text.
Incidentally, these reasons also explain why it is not enough to expect the Eaves test to
provide the incentives for efficient behavior in ERISA litigation. Although the Eaves test will affect the incentives of parties to seek settlement in some contexts, the prevailing party test nonetheless plays a significant role in the settlement calculus of litigants. Using the catalyst test might
make fee shifting more available, increasing the potential for bargaining failures through the
added transaction costs of fee shifting. On the other hand, the legal merits test limits the awarding of attorneys' fees and encourages settlement in a way that the Eaves test independently cannot.
- For example, some parties might have an aversion to settlement if they also worry about
having to pay attorneys' fees. They might also refuse settlement if they dispute their liability for
fee shifting.
This point most clearly demonstrates the advantage of the legal merits test over the catalyst test. Under the catalyst test, a party might refuse to settle even frivolous cases because such a
settlement might allow the opposing party to claim that the bargain made her better off than before the legal action. See Hamilton v Bank of New York (Delaware),1995 US Dist LEXIS 10464,
*6-7, *12-13 (D Del) (recognizing the plaintiff as a prevailing party even though she settled with
the defendant for reasons unrelated to the merits of her contention and did not establish the Iiability of the defendant). In contrast, allowing the courts to consider the merits behind the parties' positions would 6bviate concerns of the party desiring to rid herself of a frivolous case or
settle gratuitously. See Hooper v Demco, Inc, 37 F3d 287, 292-95 (7th Cir 1994) (rejecting the
plaintiff's demand for attorneys' fees because his case lacked merit and the defendant agreed to
help only out of charitable instincts).
It is possible that parties in this context will move toward more honest disclosures about
the merits of their cases. If bluffing has no purpose, then parties with good claims will want to
signal the quality of their cases to their opponents. Such disclosures would enhance the prospects
for settlement. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 608 (cited in note 112) (discussing how
disclosures through bargaining improves the chances for parties reaching settlement).
'
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are not present to serve a policing function by reviewing the merits of
the parties.
2. Conserving judicial resources.

Apart from affecting the rate of settlements, the legal merits test
also saves judicial resources. The availability of indemnification for le-

gal expenses invites the consumption of judicial resources as parties
litigate over the fees issue itself.3 More precisely, the process of determining whether a party should receive attorneys' fees and what

amount of fees is reasonable is costly for courts to undertake' 1 Also,
litigation over fees will likely generate more appeals, and this further
expends valuable judicial resources. Finally, the prospect of indemnity for the costs of legal actions encourages parties to overspend in
their litigation efforts because parties are less likely to have to internalize the costs of their own behavior9
The legal merits test allows courts to avoid the costs of proceed-

ing with the Eaves analysis when it is clear that the party asking for
fee compensation has not achieved any gains on the basis of a meritorious case.3 By disqualifying such parties from consideration for fee
shifting, courts can also effectively erase the need for secondary fees

litigation by the parties in an ERISA lawsuit."' Finally, with a dimmer
prospect for having someone else pay the costs of legal actions, parties
will have the incentive to spend more rationally in their ERISA lawsuits.
" See Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee-Shifting, 79 Va L Rev 2039, 2083 (1993)
(emphasizing that there are "significant hidden costs" involved with litigation over the awarding
of attorneys' fees); Dobbs, 1986 Duke L J at 438 (cited in note 52) (arguing that fee shifting
causes courts and parties to devote public and private resources to fee litigation). See also S-1
and S-2 by and through P-1 and P-2 v State Board of Education of North Carolina,6 F3d 160,171
(4th Cir 1993) (Wilkinson dissenting) ("Too frequently, legal battles over attorneys' fees merely
add another round of protracted litigation to what already has been protracted litigation on the
merits of a claim. This collateral litigation over attorneys' fees is often more heated, more arcane,
and over far higher monetary stakes than the underlying lawsuit.") (citation omitted), adopted as
the opinion of the court upon rehearing en banc,21 F3d 49 (4th Cir 1994) (per curiam).
" See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 629 (cited in note 112) ("Indemnity creates
satellite litigation, and such litigation can be quite costly.").
' See id ("Indemnity is likely to increase the appeal rate-a troublesome consequence because ... appellate courts are the bottleneck of a judicial system.").
'" See id ("The existence and costs of satellite indemnity litigation make it all the more uncertain that indemnity actually reduces the amount and aggregate costs of litigation by forcing
each party to internalize the other party's litigation cost.").
' See Farrarv Hobby, 506 US 103,117 (1992) (O'Connor concurring) (arguing that courts
will avoid "the usual complexities involved in calculating attorney's fees" when they bar parties
whose winnings are purely technical or de minimis from eligibility for fee shifting).
" The legal merits test has a better chance at reducing secondary litigation over fee shifting
than the catalyst test. See S-1 and S-2,6 F3d at 171 (Wilkinson dissenting) ("[T]he catalyst theory
of fee recovery engenders confusion and unnecessary litigation. By providing a clear rule for
achieving prevailing party status, Farrarpromises to reduce litigation over attorneys' fees.").
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CONCLUSION

The federal courts should adopt the legal merits test for determining prevailing parties in the context of ERISA fee shifting. This
standard furthers cohesion within the ERISA fee shifting doctrine and
creates a better fit between the definition of a prevailing party under
ERISA and under other federal statutes that also allow attorneys'
fees awards. The proposed prevailing party test also encourages more
efficient decisionmaking by ERISA litigants and allows the courts to
save judicial resources. Accordingly, the legal merits test represents an
improvement over the current confused and conflicted collection of
prevailing party standards under ERISA.
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